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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
UTAH SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.

vs.

5159
ROBERT B.
LOW

~IECHA1I,

PLU~IBING

et al. L UD-

SUPPLY CO.,

Defendant-Appellant,

PETITION OF APPELLANT, LUDLOW PLUMBING
SUPPLY CO. FOR RE-HEARING
The defendant and appellant Ludlow Plumbing
Supply Co. respectfully requests a rehearing in the above
entitled case upon the follo,ving grounds :

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The Supreme Court erred in overruling its prior
decision in the same case reported in 11 Utah 2d 159,
356 p. 2d 281.
2. The Supreme Court erred in holding that the
lien and claim of Ludlo'v Plumbing Supply Co. was
invalid and defective because the materials for which
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claim was made were not furnished to imp-rove property
owned by the same person or persons.
3. The Supreme Court erred in holding that the
lien and claim of Ludlow Plumbing Supply Co. 'vas
invalid and defective because the materials for which
claims were made were not apportioned to the properties
upon which they were used.
4. The Supreme Court erred in holding that Ludlow Plumbing Supply Co.'s contention that D. Spencer
Grow was the real party in interest and that Robert B.
Mecham and his wife took title to the property in their
names as agent for Grow is not substantiated by the
record.
5. The Supreme Court erred in holding that the
appellant Ludlow Plumbing Supply Co. was not induced
by the conduct of plaintiff to act differently than it
would other,vise have acted in furnishing materials and
supplies.
6. The Supreme Court erred in affirming the judgment of the trial court against the appellant Ludlow
Plumbing Supply Company.
7. The Supreme Court erred in refusing to return
the action to the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District in and for the State of Utah to hear and decide
the issue of estoppel.
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3
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Counsel for appellant would supererogate to state
fully the facts found in the· record, as they have been
set out in previous briefs, argued to the court, and mentioned in two prior opinions. However, those which are
necessary to support the present claims of error or the
inferences counsel draw therefrom will be related under
the particular point being argued. For purposes of
simplicity and clarity Utah Savings & Loan Association
will be referred to as respondent and Ludlow Plumbing
Supply Company as appellant.
POINT I.
THE SUPREl\iE COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING ITS
PRIOR DECISION IN THE SAME CASE REPORTED IN 11
UTAH 2d 159, 356 P. 2d 281.

ARGUMENT
This case has twice been argued before this Honorable Court and two diametrically opposite opinions have
been published. When that situation arises, some of the
points asserted and arguments made must necessarily
be repetitious, but it is believed by the writers of this
brief that the last decision of the Supreme Court is so
contrary to the purposes of statutory liens, equitable
principles and justice, that a partial repeating of argument should be acceptable as a means to cause the issue
to be reconsidered and a further hearing granted.
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In presenting our reasons for the contention advanced under this point, we first mention the merits of
the first decision, for they are in keeping with the principle that lien statutes should be construed reasonably
and in such a way as not to defeat their obvious purposes.
In that opinion it was recognized that the methods of
operation of Robert B. 11echam, the owner and contractor, and the mortgagee, Utah Savings & Loan Association, were such that it was impossible for the lien
claimants, including this appellant, to fix the value of
materials which went into the various properties and
that to do justice the application of the "equitable apportionment" rule should be invoked. That was a salutory
holding and the Court should not have been driven from
the position. Unfortunately, however, the Court in the
present opinion by tenuous reasoning does an about face
and exculpates l\1echam and the respondent by the simple
expedient of holding that appellant was at fault because
its notice of lien covered too much property and named
too many owners. In addition, in the first instance a
unanimous court concluded that the trial judge failed to
make necessary findings on the issue of estoppel, particularly, the knowledge or lack of knowledge by the
respondent that the money "\Vas being borrowed for the
purpose of crfating i1nprovements on the property and
that materials "rere being furnished under circumstances
that respondent reasonably should lmow that materialmen were relying upon being paid from such funds.
Now that issue is summarily dismissed and counsel for
the appellant fails to understand why a question as im-
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portant as that is now glossed over by the Court to the
benefit of a mortgagee who aided and abetted in comingling and misapplying materials and moneys to the
detriment of innocent materialmen and to the enrichment of itself. Certainly a decision which brings about
that inequitable result spa,vns the thought that sharp
practices pay large dividends. It is the hope of counsel
for appellant in this brief to convince the Court to retreat
to its original position of equity and justice and change
the result to the end that those who deal unfairly will
not carry away the prize.
We believe it essential to a proper consideration of
this first point to consider the cast of characters and the
efforts of the leading men to exploit and saddle losses
on other members of the troupe. When this is done the
respective merits of the two opinions in this case may
be weighed. The lead character by any criteria was D.
Spencer Grow; he held ninety per cent of the stock of
the plaintiff corporation and was the puppet master who
pulled the financial strings for the disbursement, allocation and payment of all moneys on all properties withollt
regard to ownership. It mattered not to him \vho owned
the land where the improvements were made or which
piece of property should be charged with the advance
as he allocated the money wherever he thought would'
best serve his interests. Any similarity between his
method of operation and that of an ordinary loan official
dealing with independent borrowers is not found in this
record. Moreover, he· well knew that funds earmarked
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for a particular loan were being misapplied and he above
all could have prevented that sort of misapplication and
the losses suffered by mechanics and materialmen.
Furthermore, he knew that materials furnished by this
appellant and other materialmen were being used indiscriminately on all properties. The second most important
character in this drama is Robert B. Mecham. While he
may have initiated the program in good faith, he learned
early in the venture that he was being used by Grow as
a device for constructing homes at less than their cost
and that a continuation of the construction would result
in losses to the suppliers and benefits to Grow and his
companies. In addition to being a tool for Grow, he was
primarily responsible for the garbled use of materials.
In this particular appeal the appellant was first considere·d by the ·Court as the innocent character who had
figuratively lost its shirt to the above-mentioned villains
- and then in a short space of time appellant became
the culprit and the rascals \vere whitewashed. If the
characterizations set out above are supported by the
record, and counsel for appellant insists they are, then
the tragedy of this litigation is apparent and the scales
are out of balance because the Court was induced to leave
a position of strength and justice· for one of weakness
and injustice. Accordingly, appellant respectfully insists
the Court erred in overruling its prior decision.
POINT II.
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THA'T
THE LIEN AND CLAIM OF LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY
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CO. WAS INVALID AND DEFECTIVE BECAUSE THE MATERIALS FOR WHICH CLAIM WAS MADE WERE NOT
FURNISHED TO IMPROVE PROPERTY OWNED BY THE
SAME PERSON OR PERSONS.

ARGUl\!ENT
In arguing this point counsel believe it significant
to point out that the Court did not find that the· appellant's materials were not used to improve all of the
properties here involved. Neither did the Court find
that all owners and plaintiff were not benefited by the
materials furnished. Accordingly, the only basis to support the Court's conclusion is the vague notion that the
notice should be held to be fatally defective because more
than one person held title to the lands covered by the
notice of intent to hold lien and the materials used on
each particular piece of property were not identified.
At this point and touching only on the ownership facet
of the argument, it might be helpful to state what the
record shows with regard to ownership and control of
properties where the appellant's materials were used.
There are seven individuals and corporations who appear
as record holders of the lands, and they are all mentioned
in the notice of lien. They are: Robert B. Mecham and
"~ife; Mid-Utah Construction Company; Radio Sales
Corporation; Grow Investment & Mortgage Company;
:nlortgage Insurance Corporation; and Thfid-Utah Broadcasting Company. The record shows that including the
:Jiechams ·every purported owner involved in all the
construction projects was controlled and manipulated by
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Grow to suit his personal purposes, and that plaintiff
Utah Savings & Loan Association belonged in that category and was used in this construction program to aid
and benefit Grow. Accordingly, we· have a situation
where all dealings by purported owners of all properties
were funneled into a channel which was managed, operated and maneuvered by the same person who controlled
the purse strings. When faced with that situation, some
of the technical principles of law on liens are inappliCable, and they are replaced by equitable· hypotheses.
Be the foregoing as it may, for the purposes of this
point alone we will assume that the corporations owning
the properties were separate and distinct entities, but
·even with that assumption we are unable to ascertain
how they, along with Grow and Mecham, have been prejudiced by the inclusion of their names and properties
in one document, and why it is invalid against them.
Primarily the filing of notice of lien is to give notice to
the owner, other lien claimants and all persons dealing
with, or claiming an interest in, the property that the
lienor is seeking to hold the property for the amount due
him for the merchandise he supplied to benefit and improve the premises. C·ertainly, not one can contend
seriously that the lien filed in this case by appellant
failed to serve that purpose. If in truth and in fact
prope-rties are owned by two different individuals, then
the premises of owner ''A" should not be saddled with
the cost of the improvements placed on the premises of
owner "B"; that, however, is not the situation here and
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has nothing to do with the question of notice. If both
individuals are named in the notice of lien, then each
has notice that the lienor is asserting some- claim against
his property; and if later there should be any question
arise in connection with the reasonable value of materials
used on the property of each owner, a Court could determine the proper charge against the property under the
doctrine of equitable apportionment. The whole concept
underlying the purposes of the lien statute is. to prevent
an owner of land from obtaining the labor and capital
of anothe-r person and retain the benefits thereof without paying therefor. Surely that wholesome principle
should not be discarded becauBe of a claim, technical at
best, that the names of more than one separate· owners
were included in the same document.
Going one step further, the Court's present opinion
seems to hold that the lien is invalid per se because of
the sweeping coverage and that even if this was a suit
involving only the appellant and Mecham, that the latter
\Vould succeed. Apparently the ·Court overlooked the
facts that in certain instance he was both owner and
contractor and that the reasons for requiring strict compliance with the statutes are not present. It may well
be that the lienor's rights must be cut off when third
parties are involved, but even then an inequitable situation would be brought about by a holding that merely
because different persons are named in a lien the security is lost and the owner gets enriched. The rationalization used by the Court in reaching that result in the case
at bar is entirely contrary to the philosophy supporting
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statutory liens, and particularly is that true when there
is not a shred of evidence that Mecham was misled because he was joined with an owner of another parcel of
land. Regardless of the broad coverage of the lien filed
by the appellant, it was docketed in good faith, it gave
more than ample notice to all interested parties, and it
covered property improved and benefited by appellant's property; and yet the full effect of the Court's
latest ruling is that the owners or their privy are permitted to retain the property without being required to
pay therefor.
To make this point perfectly clear, we are not arguIng the priority of appellant's lien and respondent's
mortgage, as we will treat with that later. What we are
seeking to impress upon the Court is that under the
present decision the lien is held to be invalid even as
against Mecham, the purported owner and prime contractor, merely because it names others than himself.
He is not protesting the validity of the lien, and it 'vould
appear to us that respondent is in no position to raise
the issue unless its mortgage is subsequent in point of
time and inferior to appellant's lien. Certainly it has
no standing or reason to complain of the infirmities in
the lien if it does not impinge on the rights fixed by the
Inortgage.
For the foregoing reasons it appears to appellant's
counsel that if the decision of the Court holding respondent's mortgage to be superior to appellant's lien is
proper, the additional holding that the lien is invalid is
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not only a mere gratuity but a gift which conceivably
could prejudice this appellant.
The generalizations set out above are supported by
the Utah law and prior pronouncements by this Court.
Ho,vever, before discussing the specifics, we believe it
advisable to mention the rule generally followed by the
more forward thinking Judges in construing lien statutes.
It is stated in 57 C.J.S. p. 500, Mechanics' Liens, paragraph 4 b. ( 2) as follows :
(2)

Liberal Construction

In most states the mechanics' lien statutes
are regarded as remedial in their nature, and
therefore must be liberally construed, subject to
the limitation that the construction must be
reasonable.
In most states mechanics' lien statutes are
regarded as remedial in their nature, and therefore generally should be liberally construed so
as to effectuate their objects and purp·os~es and
protect laborers, materialmen, or other claimants within the scope of the statutes, as well as to
promote substantial justice and equity as to all
parties concerned. This rule has been said to be
the better doctrine and to represent the trend of
more recent decisions.
With the foregoing rule In mind, we look to the
Utah statutes; Title 38, Chapter 1, § 7, insofar as relevant, it reads :
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• • • must file for record with the county
recorder of the country in which the property,
or some part thereof, is situated a claim in writing, containing a notice of intention to hold and
claim a lien, and a statement of his demand after
deducting all just credit sand offs,ets, with the
name of the owner, .if known, • • •
The Court in the last opinion quotes this section
but apparently elects to construe it as standing alone
and not in pari materia with other sections, for the quotation set out above is followed in the decision by this
statement:
"This section would appear to apply only
to a claim for work or material furnished on a
single building, structure or improvement."
We submit that if this quoted section is construed with
other pertinent sections on Mechanics' Liens that logically it must follow that if there were many buildings in
which supplies and materials were used and the name of
the owner was unknown, a lien including a statement
to that effect would be valid. If validity can be breathed
into a lien with the owner undesignated', then surely a
lien which mentions more than one owner ought to be
more effective, for at least the named owners are placed
on notice that their property is being held for a claim
asserted by the lienor.
Now as to the specific. In United States Building
& Loan Ass'n vs. Midvale Home Finance Corporation,
86 U. 506, 44 P. 2d 1090, it appears that there was more
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than one owner of the· p·roperty and so far as the record
appears only one owner was named in the notice of the
lien. Moreover, there was no attempt to designate the
amount claimed to be due the lienors on each piece of
property. Thus there was a deviation from the exact
statutory prescription, but in that case the court did not
hold the variations invalid'ated the lien. A somewhat
similar question was involved in the earlier case of
Eccles Lumber Co. vs. Martin, 31 Ut 241, 87 P.713, and
the Supre·me Court came up with the same answer. Both
of those holdings indicate the Court was not concerned
with deficiencies which did not mislead other parties to
their detriment. Counsel for respondent differentiates
these cases by merely stating that they are not authority
contrary to the· position they assert. We disagree and
assert that through misapprehension of the consequences
of the first decision the Court has wandered far afield
from equity and justice. We believe it should return ere
it is too late.
In furtherance of this point, 've submit the following;
The Court recognized that the notice of lien named only
~Iecham's and Grow-controlled corporations. In every
instance herein involved the contract to construct the
homes was negotiated betwe,en Grow and Mecham. The
corporations were owned, controlled and managed by
Grow and used by him as a shield to protect his construction manipulations. l\Ioreover, the record shows persuasively that all plaintiff's advances for construction
loans were for purposes of eventually building up the
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worth of Grow. It was impossible for any ordinary
materialman to know who was the real party in interest,
and from the method of operation and control, it was
improbable that anyone could ascertain whether Mecham
was the owner or merely an alter ego for Grow and his
corporate shields. If more o'vners were named than was
necessary and if materials were not allocated to buildings
where used by lot and block, it was because of overlapping and surreptitious activities by Mecham, Grow and
respondent. The lien statutes are intended to make it
possible for ordinary citizens to prepare notices sufficient to protect themselves and basic ingredients only
must be set out; but if notices of liens are to be declared
invalid because of technical niceties in de~criptions,
identifications, and misjoinder of parties, then not only
will laymen be. unable to meet prescribed standards, but
la,vyers 'viii be required to draw lines so carefully that
the slightest deviation will render the notice of no force
and effect. It is hoped by counsel for appellant that that
result not he forced upon the public and they are convinced that a reversal of the present holding is necessary
to restore simplicity to the preparation of the documents.

POINT III.
'THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE LIEN AND CLAIM OF LUDLOW PLUMBING COMPANY
WAS INVALID AND DEFECTIVE BECAUSE MATERIALS
FOR WHICH CLAIMS WERE MADE WERE NOT APPORTIONED TO THE PROPERTIES UPON WHICH THEY
WERE USED.
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ARGl1MENT
·Counsel for appellant present this point out of an
abundance of caution as they have a feeling that the
members of the Court who changed their 1ninds between
the t'vo decisions did so because of belief that they might
wreak havoc on the title standards now being followed
in the State of Utah. Counsel believe that these fears
are unfounded, for facts control principles of law and
equity and when, as here, the Court is faced with a
peculiar factual base which shows comingling of funds,
shifting of materials and uncertainties in connection with
the place of use, a liberal construction of the statute in
favor of an innocent party could not affect the standards
adversely. l\Ioreover, consideration should be given to
the possibility that greater harm may result to the standards if the rules laid down in Eccles Lumber Co. vs.
l\fartin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713, and United States Building & Loan Association vs. Midvale Home Finance Corporation, 86 Utah 506, 44 P. 2d 1090, are clouded.
Obviously the members of the Court joining in the
majority opinion must believe that those cases can be
distinguished from the one at Bar. Counsel appreciate
that distinctions of varying degrees can be pointed out
when the holdings in different cases are being compared,
but in the case at Ba.r, the majority opinion appears to
rely on a very weak reed for this is the distinguishing
feature:
"As previously pointed out, Ludlow's notice
of a lien included properties owned by the Growcontrolled corporations in addition to the properSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ties o'vned by the Mecham's. Therefore its clailn
is defective and invalid because the materials for
which claim was made were not ·furnished upon
buildings owned by the same person or persons.''
While it is recognized that this quotation goes
around the periphery of this issue, it seems that by
implication the Court is touching on the failure of appellant to fix the amount of materials used to improve each
piece of property. As previously mentioned, if the
factual situation was different the rule announced in the
quotation might be appropos, but here when you push
aside the window dressing you see the familiar face of
Grow in every building and the rule concerning failure
to designate the materials used on each piece of property
is governed by the above cited cases and therefore re·quires reversal of the present holding.
POINT IV
THE SUPREME COUR'T ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY COMPANY'S CONTENTION
THAT D. SPENCER GROW WAS THE REAL PARTY IN
INTEREST AND THAT ROBERT B. MECHAM AND HIS
WIFE TOOK TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN THEIR NAMES
AS AGENT FOR GROW IS NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY THE
RECORD.

ARGUMENT
Because the Court merely notes that the issue is not
substantiated by the record, counsel for appellant is
unable to ascertain the particular deficiency. However,
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we do assert that the Record shows the following and
that it is more than ample to sustain the assigned error~
The record titles to the various propertie·s in these
areas were vested in either Mecham, or Grow's companies; that the real party in intere.st, that is, the company which was seeking to break into the construction
loan business was at all times the respondent who acted
through its p-rincipal stockholder, Grow; that at his direction, it furnished all monies, not only for the construction of the houses on the prop.erty, but also for the purchase price· of the property; that 11echam had little, if
any, equity in any of the properties; that respondent
furnished more money on the Keyridge property than the
total cost of the real estate and the contract price for the
buildings; that it financed the construction on the
Schauerhamer property and it furnished all monies to acquire the Rowley and LaMesa prop·erties; that when
l\ieeham and Grow concluded that the Rowley and LaMesa areas should be improved ~fecham was so heavily
in debt that he \Vas unable to complete the construction
of the houses which he had agreed to build in the Keyridge area and the Schauerhamer area; that it was ne·ces-sary to obtain more land to raise moneys through respondent's mortgages in order to complete the houses for
Grow or his companies in th~ Keyridge and Schauerharner areas; that l\tfecham had no money when he negotiated with Rowleys for the acquisition of the LaMesa
property and that he made the payment called for by the
contract out of monies advanced by the respondent on the
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other properties which misapplication was concurred in
by Grow; that he was instructed by Grow to do the negotiating for the property and to take title or to enter into a
contract for the purchase of the property in his,
Mecham's, name and that respondent would furnish the
money to make payment; that Grow was at all times the
President of respondent Company and the controlling
stockholder; that he was President or an officer and
controlling stockholder in all of the companies which
held title to the various properties; that he controlled,
directed, supervised and managed the building and financial activities of ~1echam, and if the latter had any voice
in the ultimate decision it was so weak it could not be
heard; that Grow sat on the loan committee and approved
loans to each of theS'e companies and in legal effect he
was dealing with himself; that 95% of the construction
loans made by respondent were to Grow companies;
that as between ~iecham, Grow and the companies there
were no arms length dealings; that respondent advanced
$30,000.00 out of mortgages placed on the LaMesa
property before any work was started in that area; that
at the direction of Grow and through the operations
of respondent company, money was paid to complete
houses and property owned' by Grow; and that so far
as this record shows Mecham 'vas merely a tool which
Grow used for his benefit and through 'vhom he
successfully enriched himself at Appellant's expense.
If, in law, that set of facts does not show a principal
who controlled the thinking, acting and ordering and an
agent 'vho Inerely follo,ved directions and orders, then
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couns'el fails to understand how a status can be created
which is that of principal and agent.
POINT V.
THE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE APPELANT LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY COMPANY
WAS NOT INDUCED BY THE CONDUCT OF PLAINTIFF TO
AGT DIFFERENTLY THAN IT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE
ACTED IN FURNISHING MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES.

ARGUMENT
This point is without a doubt the most important to
the success or failure of appellant and the Court in its
latest decision committed its most egregious error when
it gave short shrift to its disposition and then dispoS'ed
of it wrongly. The Trial Judge did worse, for he failed
to give any consideration to the issue· and made no
finding of fact thereon even though importuned to do
so by counsel for appellant. For the latter reason alone
it would appear to follow that the present decision must
be reversed, for under the law, as we interpret it, when
findings are insufficient the Supreme Court remands
the case to the Trial Judge to make appropriate findings
of fact on all material and relevant issues. See Utah
Association of Credit Men vs. Home Fire Insurance Co.,
36 Utah 20, 102 P. 631.
In the latest opinion in this instance the Supreme
Court cites 57 C.J.S. p. 768 and recognizes the~ rule
therein laid down. It states good law and we quote the
pertinent parts :
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"A mortgagee may be precluded by estoppel
or the like from claiming priority over the holder
of mechanics' or materialmen's liens and, where
a mortgagee has failed to.take the necessary steps
prescribed by statute to obtain priority for himself over mechanics' liens, equity will not disregard the terms of the statutes to avoid the
consequences of the mortgagee's own carelessness. A mortgagee may by reason of his having
induced the furnishing of labor or materials be
precluded from asserting the priority of a mortgage over a mechanic's lien.,.,

''Of course the facts in particular cases may
not be such as to estop or preclude the mortgagee
from asserting priority. In order to establish
an estoppel against the mortgagee a lienholder
must show some concealment, misrepresentation,
act or declaration on which the lienholder properly relied and by which he was induced to act
differently than he would otherwise have acted."
The limited reason mentioned by the majority members of the ·Court to dispose of this issue of estoppel
is that a reading of the record and the Findings of Fact
revealed to them that the defending lien claimants were
not induced by the plaintiff to act differently than they
would otherwise have acted. Counsel for appellant, like
the dissenting members of the Court, take sharp issue
with that conclusion for it ignores hu1nan conduct and
behavior. Obviously, we can speak only for this lienor;
but as to hiln there are many reasons why the majority
of the Court overlooked the obvious and we hereinafter mention a few.
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First, the record indicates clearly that Mecham was
insolvent and in debt to the ~extent of some $150,000.00.
Common sense would suggest that a materialman would
not furnish materials to a debtor that he knew was unable to pay. Respondent knew 1\fecham's financial condition but for reasons best known to it, no disclosure
was made to appellant. This concealment induced appellant to continue extending credit.
Second, ordinary banking practice by a reputable
institution leads materialm·en to believe that money would
cease to be advanced if a builder was bankrupt. Significantly, respondent continued to furnish funds to Mecham
during a substantial period of time, knowing he \vas
unable to pay his bills. Had respondent not played along
with ~fecham, appellant would have stopped the flow of
supplies.
Third, this appellant would not have furnished
materials to ne\v properties had it known that money
to be realized from mortgages placed on that land was
to be diverted to and used for the payn1ent of improvements on other properties belonging to the principal
stockholder of the lender. Again, had respondent, who
was participating in this practice, notified appellant
of the true situation, the later supplies would not have
been shipped.
Fourth, respondent knew l\[echam \Vas losing money
on his construction and it not only remained silent about
that condition, but it \vent further and led third parties
to believe he was prospering. It is axiomatic that
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materialmen do not ordinarily furnish supplies to losing
ventures without requiring some security.
Fifth, this appellant would not have continued to
furnish materials had it been informed that padded
notes secured by the ostensible owner, were obtained
by the mortgagee 'vho just happens to be the respondent
and winner of the last round.
Sixth, no sane merchant would extend credit to a
debtor whose principal source of income was funds realized from mortgages when those funds were heing misapplied and paid to a selective few, particularly, individuals or companies allied in the venture and the
principal stockholder of the mortgagee.
We could advance other reasons to further undernline the conclusion reached by a majority of the Court,
but we believe the foregoing are sufficient to show
that resp,ondent's concealment and action were intended
to and did mislead this appellant to do something he
otherwise would not have done, namely to furnish materials to the subsequent projects. Accordingly, we believe
the conclusion reached by a majority of the Court is
based on the quicksand of a mistaken belief that there
'vas no inducement.
Apparently other matters of some importance were
overlooked by the n1ajority of the Court. This record
does not show a single and isolated transaction between
Mechan1 and appellant. On the contrary, it discloses
d\ealings continuous in nature taking place over a sub-
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stantial period of time. Appellant furnished materials
and supplies on an open account basis and they were
delivered from the 6th day of June 1956 to the 19th
day of June 1957. Obviously at any time during that
period had the appellant been informed of the method
of operation and irregular payments by respondent at
the direction and for the benefit of its principal stockholder the stream of supplies could have been stopped
and appellant's losses prevented. However, due to respondent's activities, together with those of its controlling stockholder, Grow, app·ellant 'vas led to believe
that all was in financial order and that moneys available to be paid out for the construction would be channeled in proper sources. Now it is met with the mere
assertion by the Court that respondent's conduct did
not induce it to act differently than it would otherwise
have acted. That declaration is plainly contrary to
ordinary business practices and procedures.
Having argued that appellant was induced to its
detriment because of respondent's conduct, we now consider the method by which we saddle respondent with
misleading the appellant. Estoppel is an equitable remedy and it is applied to a situation where, because of
something which he has done or omitted to do, a party
is denied the right to plead or prove an otherwise important fact. The doctrine must be rooted in the facts
and circumstances of a particular case. And so we
look to this record to ascertain whether the respondent,
because it acted by, through and at the direction of
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Grow, should be denied the right to plead and prove
that appellant's lien is invalid. Grow was the principal
stockholder and the agent of respondent in all of these
transactions, and his knowledge is imputable to the
respondent. He knew that during the construction of
the first homes in the Key Ridge area that Mecham was
losing money; he was well aware of the fact that materialmen were furnishing materials to improve the property,
and he took no action to notify them of l\lecham's bankrupt financial condition; but on the contrary, he worked
with Mecham to obtain additional properties on which
to construct homes in the hope that the amounts due
on the Key Ridge property could be paid, thereby giving
the impression that l\{echam was solvent. He had the
respondent advance the money for the purchase of the
property and had it divert funds which should have been
used on the subsequent developments to those properties
which were encumbered earlier. The whole thrust of
the plan was to benefit and protect properties owned
either by Grow or his controlled corporations, and the
diversions resulted in a shortage of payments on the
properties subsequently developed. 'Vithout going further into detail, if kno,vledge of the facts 1nentioned only
in this paragraph is chargeable to the respondent, most
certainly it should be estopped. IIo"·ever, the con1plete
knowledge by Gro,v, as pointed -out in other sections of
the brief, is imputable to respondent and the whole
bundle of facts, when considered in the proper perspective, compel a holding that respondent should not be
heard to eomplain of the deficiencies in the notice of
the lien, if there are deficiencies.
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One other question touching on this point needs
clarification: it is to be noted that appellant is claiming that respondent is estopped from asserting the invalidity of the lien and also from asserting that its
mortgage is superior to appellant's lien. We have set
forth the reasons for estoppel on the first ground, and
so we move on to discuss why respondent should be
estopped from making the later assertion. In that connection we believe that without question the evidence
shows a unitary plan or scheme to promote a building
venture \vhich included construction in several noncontiguous areas. The s-cheme and device of 1\fecham, aided
and abetted by Grow and' respondent, was that materials
should be furnished to a given location; from here they
were distributed to the several projects and no attempt
was made to keep a record of the particular area where
used, and appellant was informed it made no difference.
The appellant had one contract, and the original materials
were furnished on the 6th day of June 1956; that is the
time the appellant's lien took effect, and any mortgages
recorded thereafter are subsequent to that lien. But
assuming the worst situation against appellant, and
that is, that each building project 'vas a separate and
distinct transaction, then as previously pointed out
the acts and conduct of respondent and Grow misled
this appellant into believing that it was dealing with
one contractor, financed by one lending company, and
building under one construction plan. Accordingly, if respondent is not estopped from contending each home was
a separate and independent transaction and can escape
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26

liability on the basis that its mortgage is prior to appellant's lien, then it is granted a largess because of its own
misconduct. We do not believe principles of law when
correctly applied bring about this result, and we acccordingly contend this point should be sustained in appellant's
favor.
POINTS v"'I - VII.
Counsel for appellant believe the arguments set
out previously adequately present their views on these
points. However, in connection with Point VII, we call
the Court's attention to its prior decisions in which it
has held that the trial court's failure to find on all
material issues is error and that the trial judge must
find the facts upon every issue, either affirmatively
or negatively. See Piper vs. Eakle, 78 Utah 342, 2 P.2d
909; and Thomas vs. Clayton Piano Co., 47 Utah 91,
151 P. 143. In this case the trial judge failed to follow
those authorities and because of his preferred position
to detennine the credibility of 'vitnesses and the issue of
estoppel, this Court should return the case to him for
further proceedings.
Respectfully subn1itted,

' r·

George
Latimer, and
Backman, Baclnnan & Clark,
Attorneys for appellant
Ludlow Plumbing Supply Co.
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